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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the current state of the Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) and 
decides what improvements can be used to improve system operational readiness and life-
cycle support. Currently, CIWS is supported by a Readiness Based Sparing Model that has 
drawn criticism from senior naval leaders for the operational availability (Ao) that it 
provides. We analyze data to derive a list of five “key offenders” parts that heavily impact 
operational availability of CIWS. We also analyze how improving the sparing of these “key 
offenders” can potentially improve operational availability. Additionally, we analyze the 
timing of actual failures in the fleet. This paper addresses CIWS operational readiness and 
life-cycle support while exploring whether other processes can be used to improve the 
operational readiness of U.S. Guided Missile Destroyers’ CIWS systems. The major 
findings of our research are as follows: first, timing “luck” of failures accounted for a 7% 
difference between the worst-case scenario downtime and actual downtime. Second, that 
actual system availability was 86% of calendar days over fiscal years 2017 and 2018, 
exceeding NSWC’s Ao predictions. Third, that the top five “key offenders” of which these 
parts can potentially affect account for a 3% improvement to operational downtime. 
Finally, that 10 of the 67 ships showed no downtime associated with CIWS, which could 
be a result of operational schedules. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Navy is currently the world’s largest, most powerful, and most 
technologically advanced Navy. Although other countries’ navies are rapidly expanding 
and becoming more formidable, the United States continues to dominate the seas. To 
emphasize the Navy’s dominance, the Navy’s mission statement states, “The mission of 
the Navy is to maintain, train, and equip combat-ready naval forces capable of winning 
wars, deterring aggression, and maintaining freedom of the seas” (Military.com, n.d.). 
One weapon that allows the U.S. Navy to continuously accomplish this mission is 
the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS). The CIWS is a powerful defensive weapon 
that protects the surface fleet from airborne and surface threats. The CIWS is a mission-
critical system that enables the Navy to operate in any environment without worrying about 
offensive threats. Although the CIWS is a strong defensive weapon, throughout its lifespan, 
the fleet has experienced logistics and sustainment issues with the CIWS, which is greatly 
affecting its operational availability (Ao). Both anecdotal evidence and research from Apte 
and Rendon (2009) regarding the CIWS imply that the system has a reputation for being 
unreliable. The CIWS system dates to 1980 and has gone through several generations of 
improvements. In the last decade, analysis from Apte (2004 & 2009), Chaparro (2003), and 
Rendon (2009) has been undertaken to examine costs, Ao, life-cycle support, and logistics. 
This information helped shape our own conclusions and recommendations. 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the current state of the CIWS and apply 
data analysis to improve our understanding of Ao and identify life-cycle support 
opportunities for the system. Currently the CIWS is supported by a Readiness-Based 
Sparing (RBS) model, which has drawn some criticism from senior naval leaders for the 
Ao it currently provides. In this paper, we explore whether different approaches and 
processes can be used to improve Ao, specifically for U.S. Guided Missile Destroyers 
(DDG), which account for the majority of CIWS usage fleetwide. 
We gathered unclassified demand data from three primary sources: 
1. Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Corona Division’s top 20 Anti–
Air Warfare and Anti–Surface Warfare CIWS offenders from Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2014 through FY2018 (Guided Missile Destroyers only) 
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2. Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Weapon Systems Support 
(WSS) Common Electronics Integrated Weapons System Team’s Major 
Critical and Critical Major Minor Demand from FY2017 and FY2018  
3. Commander Naval Surface Forces Atlantic (CNSF) Supply Management 
Office’s CIWS demand history from Calendar Year (CY) 2014 to 
CY2019. 
We utilized NSWC Corona’s listings of the top 20 offenders to CIWS Ao as the 
starting point for our data processing. We then screened NSWC’s listing of offenders 
against the historical demand data provided by NAVSUP WSS and CNSF to develop a 
listing of our top five key offenders where we expect a high likelihood that allowancing 
measures will improve the material availability of the CIWS. Our research reviews other 
naval acquisition contracts, commercial weapon solutions as well as contracting 
techniques, to find improvements to the life-cycle support of the CIWS. These proposed 
solutions can offer different perspectives into providing superior service to our warfighters. 
We are not aware of any previous attempts to use multiple data sets to find “key offenders” 
and utilize data analysis and private sector solutions in order to increase Ao. Finally, we 
take a neutral look at the data without organizational pressures and then provide financially 
feasible recommendations to improve Ao for the CIWS. 
The major findings of our research are as follows: first, timing “Luck” of failures 
accounted for a 7% difference between the worst-case scenario downtime and actual 
downtime over fiscal years 2017 and 2018. Secondly, the actual system availability was 
86% of calendar days during that two year span, exceeding NSWC’s Ao predictions. Third, 
the top five key offenders of which these parts can potentially account for a 3% 
improvement to operational downtime. Finally, 10 of the 67 ships showed no downtime 
associated with CIWS which could be a result of operational schedules. 
In Chapter II, we describe the current state of CIWS, its employment, detailed 
history, and evolution of the CIWS system. We then go into the life-cycle support of the 
CIWS. Chapter III discusses the data sets and the methodology of combining three different 
data sets into a clean and coherent data set that can be analyzed. Chapter IV discusses the 
results of our data analysis.  Our final chapter discusses our overall conclusions and 
recommendations for the project. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The background chapter provides a broad introduction and history of the CIWS 
weapon system and naval supply history. The system’s capabilities and how it is typically 
employed throughout the fleet are discussed. This discussion also covers the current state 
and supply procedures and details about the current state of life-cycle support for the 
CIWS. This chapter also contains a discussion of how Naval Systems Supply Command, 
(NAVSUP) provides logistical support to the CIWS via contracting. This leads into a 
discussion of how supply officers afloat also directly affect the life-cycle sustainment and 
how each of these factors affects the Ao of the system.  
A. THE CLOSE-IN WEAPON SYSTEM  
The Close-In Weapon System is a defensive weapon used in the United States Navy 
to defend against incoming airborne and missile threats. Originally called the Block 0, the 
system was developed in the 1970s and was “designed to defeat low-altitude anti-ship 
cruise missiles (ASCMs). As anti-ship cruise missiles became more complex in maneuvers 
and ability to be detected, and warfare areas moved from open ocean to littoral 
environments, CIWS has evolved to meet the threat” (Pike, 2003).  
Essentially a Gatling gun, the CIWS is a fast-reaction, detect-through-
engage, that can fire 4,500 rounds per minute. It has two modes, surface and 
airborne, which are used to detect incoming enemy aircraft and missiles. At 
sea, it is designed to defeat anti-ship missiles and close-in threats that have 
pierced other lines of defense. On land, as part of the U.S. Army’s counter-
rocket, artillery and mortar systems, it detects and destroys incoming 
rounds. It also helps provide early warning of attacks. (Raytheon, 2019)  
It is commonly referred throughout the Navy as the “R2-D2” from the Star Wars 
movie franchise, due to its shape, as seen in Figures 1 and 2.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 4 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
 CIWS on the USS Nimitz. Source: U.S. Navy (2019).  
  
 CIWS on the USS Wasp. Source: U.S. Navy (2019).  
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B. CURRENT STATE, HISTORY, AND EVOLUTION OF CIWS 
The CIWS is currently employed on every type and platform of surface ship 
throughout the U.S. naval fleet. There are 217 systems onboard ships currently according 
to Jared Conley, who is the CIWS Program Manager in NAVSUP WSS Code N96162 (J. 
Conley, email to author, August 19, 2019). That number fluctuates as new ships are 
introduced and older ships are decommissioned.  
The CIWS is a vital system that is required for passage through most major high-
traffic sea lanes (e.g., Straits of Malacca). If the CIWS is not fully operational, a ship may 
not be able to defend against potential threats, thus affecting its operational capability. One 
of the U.S. Navy’s key tenets is to ensure freedom of the seas, and if this weapon system 
is degraded, then the Navy potentially would not be able to accomplish its mission. 
The technical specifications for the CIWS are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Phalanx CIWS Specifications. Adapted from Pike (2003). 
Primary Function  Anti-ship missile defense  
Contractor  Raytheon Systems Company  
(formerly Hughes Missile Systems Company and purchased from 
General Dynamics Pomona Division in 1992)  
Weight  12,500 pounds (5,625 kg)  
Later models 13,600 pounds (6,120 kg)  
Range  Classified  
Gun Type  M-61A1 Gatling  
Type of Fire  3,000 rounds per minute.  
Later models 4,500 rounds per minute  
(starting 1988 production, Pneumatic Gun Drive)  
Magazine Capacity  989 rounds  
Later models 1,550 rounds  
Caliber  20mm  
Ammunition  Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS),  
Depleted Uranium or Tungsten sub-caliber penetrator 
Sensors  Self-contained search and track radar  
Search Radar  Ku-band; digital MTI  
Track Radar  Ku-band; pulse Doppler monopulse  
E/O Sensor  FLIR Imaging System with Automatic Tracker  
Fire Control  Director with closed-loop spotting  
Gun Drive  Pneumatic  
Mount Drive  Electric  
Date Deployed  1980 (aboard USS America) 
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The Block 0 was designed to defeat low altitude anti-ship cruise missiles. The first 
test platform for the weapon was onboard the USS King (DDG-41) in 1973. Based on this 
initial test, the Navy determined that the system needed additional improvements to 
increase performance and reliability.  
Figure 3 illustrates the timeline of CIWS including upgrades.  
 
 Phalanx Family Evolution. Source: (Stoner, N.D.) 
Pike (2003) stated the following about the variations of the CIWS and 
improvements made to each variant of the system.  
Block 1 (Implemented 1987) incorporated a new search antenna to detect 
high altitude missiles, improve search sensitivity, and increase the 
ammunition available for firing by 50% through the use of a pneumatic gun 
drive that increased the firing rate to 4,500 rounds per minute, and started 
using tungsten ammunition as well as depleted uranium. Block I 
improvements provide increased elevation coverage, larger magazine space 
for increased round capacity, a variable and higher gun fire rate, and 
improved radar and processing capabilities.  
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Block 1A (Implemented 1995) incorporated a new High Order Language 
Computer (HOLC) to provide more processing power over the obsolete 
general-purpose digital computer, improved fire control algorithms to 
counter maneuvering targets, search multiple weapons coordination to 
better manage engagements, and an end-to-end testing function to better 
determine system functionality.  
Block 1B Phalanx Surface Mode (PSUM) (Implemented 1997) incorporates 
a side mounted Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) which enables 
CIWS to engage low slow or hovering aircraft and surface craft. 
Additionally, the FLIR assists the radar in engaging some ASCMs bringing 
a greater chance of ship survivability. Block 1B uses a thermal imager 
Automatic Acquisition Video Tracker (AAVT) and stabilization system that 
provide surface mode and electro-optic (EO) angle track. These Block 1B 
enhancements provide day/night detection capability and enable the CIWS 
to engage small surface targets, slow-moving air targets, and helicopters.  
Baseline 2C (Implemented 1999) improvements provide an integrated 
multi-weapon operations capability, during integrated operations, the 
command system controls CIWS sensors, target reports, mode employment, 
and doctrine. The sensors are utilized to provide 360-degree search and 
track coverage, while providing track data to, and receiving designations 
from, the Command system. This CIWS installation includes a conversion 
kit for each weapon group to facilitate ease and safety of maintenance; the 
maintenance enclosure kit installs the below-deck equipment for a gun 
mount in a prefabricated enclosure with the mount located above it. (Pike, 
2003) 
C. CIWS LIFE-CYCLE SUSTAINMENT AND SUPPORT 
Any major military weapon system requires a tremendous amount of logistical 
support throughout the life of the weapon system. CIWS is no exception. Overall, the U.S. 
Navy’s top echelon sustainment command, the Naval Supply Systems Command 
(NAVSUP), is responsible for the life-cycle support of the CIWS. NAVSUP is responsible 
for providing the full spectrum of logistical support and services to the warfighter. It is the 
business arm of the Navy and has the responsibility to ensure supplies, services, and quality 
of life necessities are being fulfilled. (For a complete history of NAVSUP, see Appendix 
A.) NAVSUP Weapons System Support (WSS) is working continuously with naval supply 
officers onboard surface vessels supporting and responding to CIWS system Ao.  
 NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support provides program and supply support 
for the weapon systems that keep our naval forces mission ready, exercising 
centralized control of more than 375,000 different line items of repair parts, 
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components, and assemblies providing global logistics support to our 
Navy’s ships, aircraft, and weapon systems. (J. Derk, personal 
communication, August 8, 2019)  
United States Naval ships operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a 
year. That is not possible without extensive logistical support worldwide. Naval supply 
officers serve onboard every Naval ship in the fleet. They are given extensive training and 
guidance on the fastest, most efficient ways in providing critical support when their ship 
calls for it.  
From the authors experience as Navy supply officers, we are expected to execute a 
variety of missions, including supply management, expeditionary logistics, inventory 
control, disbursement, financial management, material and operational logistics, food 
service, and physical distribution. The overarching guidance for how exactly to operate 
onboard ships is the NAVSUP Publication 485, or P-485 as it is commonly referred to in 
the fleet.  
The executive summary for the publication follows:  
Afloat Supply Procedures establishes policies for the operation and 
management of afloat supply departments and shore-based units of the fleet 
operating forces operating under afloat procedures. The procedures 
contained in this publication are the minimum essential acceptable supply 
management procedures and are mandatory unless specifically stated as 
being optional. (Department of the Navy [DoN], 1997)  
The P-485 gives extremely detailed instruction on all the supply corps disciplines 
and explains the procedures for conducting inventories, ordering parts, responding to high-
priority situations, and so on.  
One of the most important functions faced by supply officers afloat is providing 
expedited logistical support for high-priority parts. When a major system aboard a ship 
(weapons, engineering, and communication) fails and the commanding officer determines 
that the ship cannot complete its mission, a report is generated to tell higher echelon 
commands of the situation. This report is called a Casualty Report, or CASREP. The 
CASREP gives a detailed description of the problem, actions taken to correct the problem, 
and its impact on mission capability and logistical support, which directly affects Ao.  
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The supply officer has a critical part to play in the CASREP process. In the supply 
section of the CASREP, logistics specialists will include part information and a requisition 
that is vital to the ship correcting the problem and returning to full operational capability. 
The requisition is a specific type, the highest priority in the supply system called a Not 
Operational Ready Supply, or NORS, requisition. The NORS requisition is also known as 
a WHISKEY requisition. However, a WHISKEY requisition is the common term among 
Navy supply officers. In supply terms, NORS means that the ship needs the supply chain 
to direct its full attention to this critical part. Per instruction in the P-485, the supply system 
has 14 days to get that part to the ship, no matter where it is in the world. An experienced 
supply officer will know the system and key players and if in port, should be able to reduce 
that 14-day requirement significantly. The CASREP/NORS process is one of the most 
crucial for Naval ships being able to operate around the world at any given time. Naval 
supply officers have a direct effect on the overall CIWS system Ao.  
Operational availability of a system can be defined by the NSWC as the 
probability that the system capable of performing its specific function in its 
intended environment when called for at a random point in time. The Ao 
effects the ship or systems probable availability in a wartime mission vice 
observed calendar operation. (Naval Surface Warfare Center, 2018, p 5). 
In our case, Ao, can be described as how much time the CIWS is functional versus 
how much it is down because of broken parts or maintenance.  
The Operational Availability formula is 
 
Where: 
“MTBF is the mean time between failures, also referred to as mean time between 
critical failure. MRT is the mean restoration time. This typically consists of mean logistics 
delay time (MLDT), plus mean time to repair” (MTTR; Reliability Analytics Toolkit, 
2019). 
As discussed in the previous section, when a U.S. Navy Destroyer CIWS has a 
repair parts failure that results in a CASREP, we make the assumption that the entire CIWS 
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is down and not operational. This would mean the system is down, which in turn is affecting 
Ao. As we discuss the key offenders and the complete data sets, these parts are affecting 
the downtime/uptime and Ao of the system. 
The acquisition tool that provides the life-cycle support for the CIWS is a 
Performance Based Logistic Contract (PBL). According to Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) (2013), Performance Based Logistics is defined as the following: 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL)—PBL is synonymous with 
performance-based life-cycle product support, where outcomes are acquired 
through performance-based arrangements that deliver Warfighter 
requirements and incentivize product support providers to reduce costs 
through innovation. These arrangements are contracts with industry or inter-
governmental agreements. Attributes of an effective PBL arrangement 
include:  
• Objective, measurable work description that acquires a product 
support outcome.  
• Appropriate contract length, terms, and funding strategies that 
encourage delivery of the required outcome  
• A manageable number of metrics linked to contract requirements 
that reflect desired Warfighter outcomes and cost reduction goals.  
• Incentives to achieve required outcomes and cost-reduction 
initiatives.  
• Risks and rewards are shared between government and commercial 
product support integrators and providers.  
• Synchronization of product support arrangements to satisfy 
Warfighter requirements. (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 
2013)  
The overall picture of support from product support providers to the warfighter can 
be seen in Figure 4. Currently the CIWS is supported by NAVSUP WSS via a PBL 
contract. 
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 Product Support Business Model. Retrieved from Department of Defense (2011) 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
There has been a significant amount of literature written about the CIWS, its 
associated costs and availability, life-cycle support, and modeling for the system. We focus 
on three articles of related research:  
• A Diagnostic Approach to Weapon System Life cycle Support: The 
Phalanx Close-in Weapon System (Apte & Rendon, 2009) 
• An Analysis of Spending Patterns Associated with the Phalanx Close-In 
Weapon System (CIWS) Program (Chaparro, 2003) 
• Optimizing Phalanx Weapon System Life-Cycle Support (Apte, 2004) 
1. A Diagnostic Approach to Weapon System Life-Cycle Support: The 
Phalanx CIWS  
Apte and Rendon’s (2009) focus is to evaluate the current life-cycle support for the 
CIWS and examine costs, optimization, Ao, reliability metric, casualty reports, life-cycle 
support, and logistics. This research analyzes a more efficient way, given various 
operational factors, how to better provide critical life-cycle support to the CIWS.  
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At the time this research (2009) was conducted, the Phalanx CIWS—based 
on the literature reviewed, data analyzed, and our communication with the 
Program Executive Offices (PEO) personnel—seemed to be caught in a 
vicious circle of high cost but low operational availability. (Apte & Rendon, 
2009, p. 3)  
The authors found that the life-cycle support for the CIWS cycle is costly and at 
times inefficient. The system is in a cycle of high costs but a low return on Ao.  
2. An Analysis of Spending Patterns Associated with the PHALANX 
Close-In Weapon System CIWS Program 
This December 2003 Naval Postgraduate School thesis by Michael Chaparro 
focuses on the spending patterns for the CIWS and identifies potential areas of 
investigation for cost savings. The data in this research covers FY1998–2003 and includes 
total costs, both government employee and contractor labor, travel, and material costs. 
Several government entities are considered, including In-Service Engineering Agent 
(ISEA), Navy Fleet Technical Support Center Atlantic and Pacific (FTSCLANT/PAC), 
and Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP), which is now known as WSS and Program 
Executive Offices.  
Chaparro (2003) found that CIWS contracted labor support is costly and there is 
potential for cost savings. Through the five fiscal years studied (FY1998–2003), Chaparro 
found that labor cost spending was higher than what was planned for and expected.  
3. Optimizing Phalanx Weapon System Life-Cycle Support  
Apte’s (2004) focus was to identify the weapon system’s problem areas and suggest 
improvements for correcting those deficiencies. This article goes into the CIWS 
optimization, Ao, reliability metric, casualty reports, and life-cycle support.  
Apte’s main point of the research coincides with ours in that we both look at the 
lower Ao and rising costs and determine what can be done to improve these issues. The 
findings of this paper are as follows: “there is a high cost of maintenance for CIWS and an 
increase in CASREPs and tech assists leading to reduction of reliability” (Apte, 2004, 
p.26). This research was completed in 2004; however, the same issues continue to plague 
the CIWS weapon system 15 years later in 2019. 
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III. DATA 
Our primary goal of gathering historical demand data for CIWS material 
requirements is to establish a group of “key offenders” that we could use for further 
research and modeling. Key offenders were identified based primarily on the NSWC’s top 
20 reliability drivers and were analyzed considering Customer Wait Times (CWT) of more 
than 14 days, the total number of orders, and the total number of CASREP orders.  
We gathered unclassified demand data from three primary sources: NSWC Corona 
Division’s top 20 Anti–Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti–Surface Warfare (ASUW) CIWS 
failures from FY2014 through FY2018 (DDG only); NAVSUP Weapon Systems (WSS) 
Support Common Electronics Integrated Weapons System Team’s (IWST) Major Critical 
and Critical Major Minor demand from FY2017 and FY2018; and Commander Naval 
Surface Forces Atlantic (CNSF) Supply Management Office’s CIWS demand history from 
CY2014 to CY2019. Each data set contained limitations that are outlined in the following 
sections; however, we were able to find correlations among the data that allow for 
supported conclusions. 
A. NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER’S DATA 
NSWC Corona provided its top 20 Anti–Air Warfare and Anti–Surface Warfare 
CIWS offenders from October 1, 2013, through September 30, 2018, specifically limited 
to the DDG platform. The distinction of Anti-Air and Anti-Surface offenders is based on 
the two primary defensive roles/modes that CIWS functions under. The data included 
nomenclatures, number of failures, the part number, and National Item Identification 
Number for “Major Critical” demands.  
Additionally, NSWC provides top level metrics (Figures 5 and 6) that allow for 
trend analysis in terms of overall Ao, MTBF, and critical failures per year. We viewed the 
NSWC reliability driver data and its conclusions as the cornerstone for our follow-on 
analysis since NSWC Corona is a primary material availability assessment arm of the 
Department of the Navy. NSWC Corona’s “reliability drivers” rankings (Tables 2 and 3) 
are based on the associated part’s effect on system Operational Availability (Ao). Ao is 
defined by NSWC case as “the probability that the system capable of performing its 
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specific function in its intended environment when called for at a random point in time. 
The Ao reflects the ship or systems probable availability in a wartime mission vice 
observed calendar operation” (Naval Surface Warfare Center, 2018). 
Our limitations in using NSWC’s data are threefold. First, the listing does not 
indicate whether the “reliability driver” can be solved by the stocking posture of 
replacement parts or whether the issues are design/engineering-related. Second, we do not 
have the granularity in this data to analyze CWT, which will be a key deciding factor in 
establishing our list of “key offenders.” NSWC’s data does take CWT into account in its 
calculation of Ao through Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT), but we are specifically 
concerned with delays of more than 14 days, which may not be completely visible in their 
calculations. Third, we do not have granularity on CASREP-specific failures to analyze. 
Again, similar to the CWT concern, NSWC does take CASREP failures into account, but 
they display the information at higher level conclusions, restricting our ability to perform 
further analysis. The NAVSUP WSS and CNSF data sets will allow us to confirm the issues 
of CWT and CASREP-related failures (Naval Surface Warfare Center, 2018). 
  
 NSWC CIWS Top Level Metrics. Adapted from Naval Surface Warfare Center 
(2018). 
Figure 5 shows fiscal years 2014 through 2018 top level metrics for both AAW and 
ASUW modes.  In the figure, Ao remains relatively stable and improving over time, with 
ranges between .65 and .78.  NSWC reports FY18Q4 Ao between .70 and .74.  The MTBF 
chart shows higher mean times between failure and variability for the red ASUW mode 
when compared to the blue AAW.  Similarly, the MDT chart shows consistently higher 
levels of down time for the ASUW mode over the four years measured. 
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 NSWC CIWS Reliability Metrics. Adapted from Naval Surface Warfare Center 
(2018). 
Figure 6 shows reliability metrics for fiscal years 2014 through 2018 for both AAW 
and ASUW modes.  Failures per Eq-Year shows a higher level of failures in the AAW 
mode versus the ASUW mode with an overall trend towards improvement in both 
categories. 
Table 2. NSWC CIWS Reliability Drivers, DDG AAW. Adapted 
from Naval Surface Warfare Center (2018). 
Reliability Driver Ranking  Nomenclature  NIIN  # of failures  
1  Rate Gyro  011594340  161  
2  Motor Brush  012458699  99  
3  Passive Limiter  014142779  23  
4  IF Receiver CCA  015611967  65  
5  DC Torque Motor  012458725  88  
6  Coolant Pump  013622973  88  
7  DC Drive Motor  011572436  60  
8  Last Round Switch  011547192  63  
9  Blower Motor  012001689  40  
10  HPA  014314290  43  
11  Exit Unit  014867071  68  
12  Cutout Switch Assy  011653830  29  
13  Rig Housing Assy  012352929  32  
14  20MM Gun Barrel  014674261  11  
15  Slip Ring Assy  012451898  37  
16  Scan Drive Assy  013264156  28  
17  Grooved Coupling 
Clp  
011564079  36  
18  Switch Flow  012187959  30  
19  Contactor Magnetic  011888017  34  
20  Breech Bolt Assy  010429821  51  
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Table 3. NSWC CIWS Reliability Drivers, DDG ASUW. Adapted 
from Naval Surface Warfare Center (2018). 
Reliability Driver Ranking  Nomenclature  NIIN  # of failures  
1  Thermal Imager  015582849  42  
2  Coolant Pump  013622973  88  
3  DC Drive Motor  011572436  60  
4  Last Round Switch  011547192  63  
5  Rate Gyro  011594340  41  
6  Blower Motor  012001689  40  
7  Exit Unit  014867071  68  
8  Cutout Switch Assy  011653830  29  
9  20MM Gun Barrel  014674261  11  
10  Grooved Coupling Clp  011564079  36  
11  Switch Flow  012187959  30  
12  Contactor Magnetic  011888017  34  
13  Breech Bolt Assy  010429821  51  
14  Pneumatic Motor  013833198  39  
15  Sector Holdback Assy  007835504  29  
16  20MM M61A1 Gun  014865515  31  
17  Safety/Display CCA  015434201  19  
18  Resistor Variable  011653831  9  
19  Solenoid Assembly  007545269  19  
20  Status Monitor CCA  012346892  11  
Table 2 and Table 3 are NSWC’s listed reliability drivers for both ASUW and 
AAW modes.  While the tables list failures as one of the metrics that NSWC assesses, they 
additionally take into account Ao, MTBF, and MDT when ranking the parts as reliability 
drivers.  This is illustrated with the thermal imager ranking as NSWC’s highest reliability 
driver, while not having the highest amount of failures listed. 
B. NAVSUP WSS FY2017 AND FY2018 CIWS DEMANDS  
The NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support Common Electronics Integrated Weapons 
System (WSS) Team provided Major Critical and Critical Major Minor demand for 
FY2017 and FY2018. The data included Job Control Numbers (JCNs), start and end dates 
for the orders, part numbers, nomenclatures, and national stock numbers. The data covered 
a total of 9,334 orders made over the two fiscal years for all classes of naval ships.  
As our research is focused on allowancing measures to combat CASREPs, we 
focused processing on the “Major Critical Category.” Orders were sorted into DDG 
platform specific demands. Customer Wait Time was calculated for NSWC’s top 20 
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Reliability Drivers as both an average CWT and number of orders delayed more than 14 
days. The 14-day cutoff is being used as the established Uniform Material Movement and 
Issue Priority System (UMMIPS) response time standard for requisitions with priorities 
01–03 ranges between four and 14 days depending on the ordering unit’s location. By this 
standard, a response time greater than 14 days is a failure by the supply system, no matter 
where the unit is located.  
C. CNSL SUPPLY MANAGEMENT OFFICE’S DATA 
The Commander Naval Surface Forces Atlantic (CNSF) Supply Management 
Office’s CIWS provided CIWS demand history from CY2014 to May 1, 2019. The data 
included 169,003 orders from all Naval platforms and was broken into National Item 
Identification Number, Quantity Ordered, Date of Demand, CWT (in hours), Allowance 
Parts List (APL), Urgency of Need indicator, Price, and Ordering Unit. We regarded the 
accuracy of the data as low, since there is clearly a significant number of orders included 
that were unrelated to the CIWS system. The data did, however, include a large date range 
and key pieces of information, such as the Urgency of Need indicator, that would allow 
order classification into CASREPs, and demand dates and ordering units that would allow 
us to cross demands over to the NAVSUP WSS data. 
Due to our concern over the quality of this data set, we are only utilizing it to 
confirm conclusions based on the two previous data sources. We processed the data by first 
separating information believed to be related to CIWS from clearly unrelated demand 
information and then removed demands unrelated to the DDG platform. DDG-specific 
demands for NSWC’s Reliability Driver National Item Identification Numbers (NIINs) 
were then assessed for the number of Urgency of Need “A” orders indicating a CASREP-
related demand. 
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IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Our discussion and analysis focus is on calculating downtime associated with the 
CIWS on DDGs, identifying our top five “key offenders,” and understanding the role that 
our “key offenders” play in CIWS operational downtime. We close the chapter with a 
discussion of potential drivers  
A. CIWS PARTS ANALYSIS 
Our analysis is based on three key processes. First, using the NAVSUP WSS FY17 
and FY18 data, we reveal the amount of downtime each DDG unit’s CIWS had over the 
two-year period, the potential worst-case scenario, and the percentage of time the ship’s 
CIWS was operational. Second, using a combination of the three data sources, we identify 
five key offenders that are negatively affecting the operational readiness of CIWS and show 
a likelihood that greater spares funding and allowancing could improve operational 
readiness. Third, we analyze the operational downtime related specifically to our key 
offenders and how related spares allowancing may potentially improve overall CIWS 
operational readiness.  
B. DDG MAJOR CRITICAL CIWS DOWNTIME 
The downtime analysis takes major critical material failures and their associated 
time from failure to repair to establish a “downtime” calculation (in days). The “Downtime 
(Actual)” column takes into account that some failures occurred over the same time period 
as other failures by overlaying repair timelines and not double-counting two repairs that 
were taking place at the same time. The “Downtime (Worst Case)” column is a calculation 
of how many days could have been lost if the failures were sequenced so that there were 
no overlapping timelines and each failure occurred after the previous failure had been 
correct. The “Operationally Avail (%)” column is a calculation of the percentage of total 
available days over the two-year period that the CIWS was operating without a Major 
Critical material failure. This data is listed in Table 4 by each DDG. 
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Table 4. DDG CIWS Major Critical Downtime 







USS Arleigh Burke DDG-51 310 352 57.5% 
USS Barry DDG-52 0 0 100.0% 
USS John Paul Jones DDG-53 0 0 100.0% 
USS Curtis Wilbur DDG-54 121 154 83.4% 
USS Stoute DDG-55 149 256 79.5% 
USS John S. McCain DDG-56 95 120 86.9% 
USS Mitchser DDG-57 284 535 61.1% 
USS Laboon DDG-58 144 169 80.2% 
USS Russell DDG-59 19 20 97.4% 
USS Paul Hamilton DDG-60 79 109 89.1% 
USS Ramage DDG-61 53 85 92.7% 
USS Fitzgerald DDG-62 0 0 100.0% 
USS Stetham DDG-63 243 625 66.7% 
USS Carney DDG-64 139 239 80.9% 
USS Benfold DDG-65 53 55 92.7% 
USS Gonzalez DDG-66 146 165 80.0% 
USS Cole DDG-67 294 488 59.7% 
USS The Sullivans DDG-68 178 275 75.6% 
USS Milius DDG-69 184 216 74.7% 
USS Hopper DDG-70 0 0 100.0% 
USS Ross DDG-71 104 113 85.7% 
USS Mahan DDG-72 71 86 90.2% 
USS Decatur DDG-73 233 413 68.0% 
USS McFaul DDG-74 47 53 93.5% 
USS Donald Cook DDG-75 245 493 66.4% 
USS Higgins DDG-76 143 195 80.4% 
USS O’Kane DDG-77 127 138 82.6% 
USS Porter DDG-78 59 85 91.9% 
USS Oscar Austin DDG-79 163 175 77.6% 
USS Roosevelt DDG-80 127 262 82.6% 
USS Winston S. Churchill DDG-81 354 611 51.5% 
USS Lassen DDG-82 53 54 92.7% 
USS Howard DDG-83 92 170 87.4% 
USS Bulkeley DDG-84 178 336 75.6% 
USS McCampbell DDG-85 25 30 96.5% 
USS Shoup DDG-86 174 382 76.1% 
USS Mason DDG-87 96 204 86.8% 
USS Preble DDG-88 101 176 86.1% 
USS Mustin DDG-89 0 0 100.0% 
USS Chafee DDG-90 54 79 92.6% 
USS Pinckney DDG-91 0 0 100.0% 
USS Momsen DDG-92 0 0 100.0% 
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USS Chung-Hoon DDG-93 39 54 94.6% 
USS Nitze DDG-94 31 32 95.7% 
USS James E. Williams DDG-95 74 170 89.8% 
USS Bainbridge DDG-96 149 174 80.8% 
USS Halsey DDG-97 23 23 96.8% 
USS Forrest Sherman DDG-98 69 70 90.5% 
USS Faragut DDG-99 91 93 87.5% 
USS Kidd DDG-100 58 95 92.0% 
USS Gridley DDG-101 0 0 100.0% 
USS Sampson DDG-102 95 102 86.9% 
USS Truxtun DDG-103 37 47 94.9% 
USS Sterett DDG-104 50 58 90.9% 
USS Dewey DDG-105 136 138 81.3% 
USS Stockdale DDG-106 65 118 91.1% 
USS Gravely DDG-107 85 91 88.3% 
USS Wayne E. Meyer DDG-108 113 119 84.5% 
USS Jason Dunham DDG-109 138 241 81.1% 
USS William P. Lawrence DDG-110 235 290 67.8% 
USS Spruance DDG-111 72 75 90.1% 
USS Michael Murphy DDG-112 82 111 88.7% 
USS John Finn DDG-113 35 65 95.2% 
USS Ralph Johnson DDG-114 3 3 99.5% 
USS Rafael Peralta DDG-115 59 65 91.9% 
USS Thomas Hudner DDG-116 0 0 100.0% 
USS Paul Ignatius DDG-117 0 0 100.0% 
 Total Down Days 6676 10152  
 Available Days 48910 48910  
 Operational Avail (%) 0.86 0.79  
 MEAN 99.6 151.5  
 STD DEV (Pop) 83.9 151.2  
 Sample Size 67 67  
Table 4 is the downtime review of DDGs over the fiscal years 2017 and 2018.  The 
mean actual downtime was 99 days with DDGs being operationally available 86% of days 
during the reviewed time period.  In the worst-case assessment, the same failures could 
have resulted in a mean downtime of 151 days which would have lowered the operationally 
available days 7% over the same time period.  Of the 67 ships assessed, 10 of them showed 
no downtime associated with the CIWS which may be the result of operational schedules 
or maintenance periods, potentially impacting the CIWS metrics.  
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C. PROJECT’S IDENTIFIED KEY OFFENDERS 
A goal of the project is to identify repair parts that, with improved allowancing, 
could improve overall readiness of the CIWS program. The starting point for our 
identification of key offenders are the NSWC’s top 20 reliability drivers. Tables 5 and 6 
present the combined processed data from all three data sources and allow for us to draw 
conclusions regarding whether the “offender” can be impacted by allowancing choices. 
The “Avg CWT” is derived from the order to receipt processing time of the associated part 
and helps us recognize a potential stocking and allowancing deficiency. Similarly, the “# 
> 14 Days” helps identify an overall supply system response failure as defined by the 
NAVSUP P-485 and associated UMMIPS requirements. The “% UND A” is an 
acknowledgement of CASREP association in material ordering and helps further identify 
critical system parts. 
Table 5. DDG AAW Combined Data Sets 
NSWC 
Ranking  












% UND A 
(CNAL 
Data)  
1  Rate Gyro  011594340  161  0.32  0  11.79  
2  Motor Brush  012458699  99  2.29  2  4.61  
3  Passive Limiter  014142779  23  5.54  2  16  
4  IF Receiver CCA  015611967  65  24.87  6  Not Listed  
5  DC Torque Motor  012458725  88  2.87  3  7.29  
6  Coolant Pump  013622973  88  0.83  0  17.33  
7  DC Drive Motor  011572436  60  6.91  4  24.66  
8  Last Round Switch  011547192  63  3.75  2  11.29  
9  Blower Motor  012001689  40  1.88  0  20.45  
10  HPA  014314290  43  9.78  6  78.43  
11  Exit Unit  014867071  68  13.08  8  73.17  
12  Cutout Switch Assy  011653830  29  2.33  0  2.86  
13  Rig Housing Assy  012352929  32  10.6  1  69.57  
14  20MM Gun Barrel  014674261  11  29  4  Not Listed  
15  Slip Ring Assy  012451898  37  6.3  2  21.43  
16  Scan Drive Assy  013264156  28  19.36  7  80.95  
17  Grooved Coupling 
Clp  
011564079  36  2.25  1  0  
18  Switch Flow  012187959  30  0.75  0  9.09  
19  Contactor Magnetic  011888017  34  7.38  3  15.63  
20  Breech Bolt Assy  010429821  51  0  0  0  
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Table 6. DDG ASUW Combined Data Sets  
NSWC 
Ranking  












# UND A 
(CNAL 
Data)  
1  Thermal Imager  015582849  42  26.12  16  Not Listed  
2  Coolant Pump  013622973  88  0.82  0  17.33  
3 DC Drive Motor  011572436  60  6.91  4  24.66  
4  Last Round 
Switch  
011547192  63  3.75  2  11.29  
5 Rate Gyro  011594340  41  0.32  0  11.79  
6 Blower Motor  012001689  40  1.88  0  20.45  
7 Exit Unit  014867071  68  13.08  8  73.17  
8 Cutout Switch 
Assy  
011653830  29  2.33  0  2.86  
9 20MM Gun 
Barrel  
014674261  11  29  4  Not Listed  
10 Grooved 
Coupling Clp  
011564079  36  2.25  1  0  
11 Switch Flow  012187959  30  0.75  0  9.09  
12 Contactor 
Magnetic  
011888017  34  7.38  3  15.63  
13 Breech Bolt Assy  010429821  51  0  0  0  
14 Pneumatic Motor  013833198  39  19.19  9  84.21  
15 Sector Holdback 
Assy  
007835504  29  1.29  0  0  
16 20MM M61A1 
Gun  
014865515  31  6.2  12  Not Listed  
17 Safety/Display 
CCA  
015434201  19  4.3  1  Not Listed  
18 Resistor Variable  011653831  9  0  0  0  
19 Solenoid 
Assembly  
007545269  19  1.67  0  0  
20 Status Monitor 
CCA  
012346892  11   1.83  0  Not Listed  
Table 5 and Table 6 include NSWC’s reliability drivers but account for logistics 
delays and stock availability.  Of the 40 listed reliability drivers in the two tables, 16 of 
them met UMMIPS logistics time standards on every order and only four of the drivers had 
average CWT over the UMMIPS 14-day standard.  The average CWT is a primary 
consideration in our assessing of how allowancing changes might impact overall Ao. 
Utilizing the information contained in Tables 5 and 6, we have identified the parts listed in 
Table 7 as key offenders and assess a high likelihood that stocking and allowancing 
measures would improve supply system response times, resulting in higher overall CIWS 
Ao. 
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Table 7. Key Offenders 
Nomenclature NIIN 






% UND A 
(CNAL Data) 
Thermal Imager 015582849 42 26.12 16 Not Listed 
IF Receiver 
CCA 015611967 65 24.87 6 Not Listed 
Pneumatic 
Motor 013833198 39 19.19 9 84.2 
Exit Unit 014867071 68 13.08 8 73.2 
Scan Drive Assy 013264156 28 19.36 7 81.0 
Table 7 is our defined key offenders derived from NSWC’s listing and accounting 
for logistics and stocking delays through CWT and delays over 14 days. 
D. DESCRIPTION OF KEY OFFENDERS 
The below discussion of “key offenders” is provided to give the reader a clearer 
understanding of what these parts do and how they interact with the CIWS system.  
1. Phalanx Thermal Imager 
The Phalanx Thermal Imager is a Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) system 
mounted on the Electro-Optical Stabilization Sub Assembly that allows for the viewing 
and recording of images from the mount. It operates in two field of view settings and has 
a digital view function. The price of the thermal imager is $342,394 without a carcass turn-
in and $31,379 with one. There are currently eight thermal imagers held in the supply 
system. The system has a run life of 2,000–4,000 hours. This system is currently not 
covered under the PBL contract and is under a basic ordering agreement with Leonardo 
DRS. Conversations with the NAVSUP WSS CIWS Program Manager indicated that 
operators regularly use the thermal imager as a navigation tool, instead of its intended 
defense purpose, degrading the anticipated system run life. This part needs to be supported 
on a contract and include incentives for the contractor to decrease the time needed to get 
parts to the warfighters. 
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2. Circuit Card Assembly 
The circuit card assembly upgraded circuit card that was added to the solid-state 
electronics suite which tripled the search range of the Phalanx system and reduced 
maintenance requirements. (M. A. Fahie, personal communication, October 10, 2019). The 
price of the circuit card assembly is $24,555 without a carcass turn-in and $10,692 with 
one. There are currently two of these circuit card assemblies in the supply system. 
Procurement lead time for a new (non-refurbished) circuit card assembly from Raytheon is 
587 days. Due to the long lead time of this item, there should be more parts in the system 
since this is a high failure item. This part is supported by the PBL, and since it affects Ao, 
there needs to be incentivized language in the contract to decrease the time to get the part 
to the warfighter. 
3. Pneumatic Motor 
The pneumatic motor converts high-pressure air to a mechanical force that allows 
the barrel of the weapons system to spin at an extremely high rate allowing for the release 
of 4,500 rounds per minute (M. A. Fahie, personal communication, October 10, 2019). The 
price of the pneumatic motor is $351,117 without a carcass turn-in and $29,093 with one. 
There is currently one spare pneumatic motor in the supply system. Procurement lead time 
for a new (non-refurbished) pneumatic motor is 502 days. Due to the long lead time of this 
item, there should be more parts in the system since this is a high failure item. This part is 
supported by the PBL and since it affects Ao, there needs to be incentivized language in 
the contract to decrease the time to get the part to the warfighter.  
4. Exit Unit 
The exit unit is the assembly that allows the ammunition to exit the drum magazine 
and, in part, makes up the assembly where the CIWS drum is loaded. The exit unit is subject 
to significant wear and tear resulting from technicians loading the drum, which may impact 
the unit’s useful life (M. A. Fahie, personal communication, October 10, 2019). The price 
of the exit unit is $169,003 without a carcass turn-in and $19,957 with one. There is 
currently one spare exit unit in the supply system. Procurement lead time for a new (non-
refurbished) pneumatic motor from Raytheon is 548 days. Due to the long lead time of this 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 26 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
item, there should be more parts in the system since this is a high failure item. This part is 
supported by the PBL, and since it affects Ao, there needs to be incentivized language in 
the contract to decrease the time to get the part to the warfighter.  
5. Scan Drive 
The scan drive is a brush motor used to allow the CIWS search antenna to spin (M. 
A. Fahie, personal communication, October 10, 2019). The price of the scan drive is 
$51,307 without a carcass turn-in and $29,079 with one. There are currently no scan drives 
in the supply system. Procurement lead time for a new (non-refurbished) scan drive from 
Raytheon is 1,032 days. Due to the long lead time of this item, it is clear that there should 
be more parts in the system since this is a high failure item. This part is supported by the 
PBL, and since it affects Ao, there needs to be incentivized language in the contract to 
decrease the time to get the part to the warfighter.  
E. KEY OFFENDERS’ IMPACT ON DOWNTIME 
The analysis of key offenders’ impact on downtime is completed in a similar 
method to the larger analysis contained in Table 4. Table 8 adds in downtime related 
specifically to any of our five identified key offenders. This “Downtime (Key offenders)” 
is derived based on a worst-case assumption of material failures, which allows for 
comparison against the overall “Downtime (Worst Case)” and removes the potential for 
luck associated with the timing of failures to play a role in the analysis. The “Key offenders 
Impact” column is the percentage of failures during the two-year period that were 
associated to one or more of our key offenders.  
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Table 8. Key offenders’ Impact on Downtime 
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Table 8 assesses the impact of our 5 key offenders on overall DDG downtime.  The 
table shows that the key offenders account for 3 percent of all CIWS downtime and account 
for 751 down days per year to the system. The USS John Finn was most effected by the 
key offenders with 94% of its downtime associated with our key offenders. 
F. DATA INACCURACIES AND DISTORTIONS 
Data Inconsistencies. Our two large data sources for analysis were the NAVSUP 
WSS FY2017 and FY2018 CIWS Demands and CNSL Supply Management Office’s Data. 
In processing the data, it became clear that significant inconsistencies existed between the 
two. As a small example, when limited to our top five key offenders listing, 6 UND “A” 
orders exist on the CNSL data set that are not reflected on the NAVSUP WSS data set and 
27 Major Critical orders exist on the NAVSUP WSS that are not reflected on the CNSL 
data. We focused our research on the NAVSUP WSS data as they are an organization more 
focused on analytics than CNSL. Institutional Language. The NAVSUP WSS and NSWC 
Corona data was focused heavily on terms “Major Critical” and “Major Critical Minor.” 
These terms are not defined or used in the NAVSUP P-485 and as a result, are not part of 
the operational supply officer’s vernacular. The change in language separates associated 
shipping and processing requirements outlined in the NAVSUP P-485 from what are likely 
CASREP and UND “A” requirements. 
Cannibalizations. Cannibalizing system parts from other weapons systems in the 
fleet is a relatively normal process for circumventing the supply system and bringing a 
priority ship to an operationally ready status. A cannibalization is the process of taking a 
working part from Ship A to fulfill a CASREP on Ship B. Ship B’s WHISKEY Requisition 
will then be sent to Ship A as “Payback.” Each cannibalization distorts impact of a material 
failure and the associated supply system response. It is recommended that future 
researchers examine cannibalization as a topic for future research. As per the P-485, 
“cannibalization is an extreme action and should be used only as a last resort” (DoN, 1997, 
p. 3004). The cannibalization process is regulated through the type commander (TYCOM), 
however there is no research on the costs and benefits of cannibalization. 
Distortions from Human Behavior. In each step of the ordering and receipt 
process, there is the opportunity for a technician to fail to input key data in a timely manner. 
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This can have the impact of showing potentially significant delays or failures in the supply 
system when they don’t exist. More experienced maintainers may be more adept to finding 
problems with a weapon system more efficiently than a maintainer who is less experienced. 
Preventing and communicating perceived demand signals when they are less urgent. 
Organizational pressure from the chain of command may pressure the maintainer and the 
supply system to bring the weapon system back online. 
Ship’s Operational Schedule. Operational schedules affect weapons systems use, 
failure rates, and logistics response times. As such, an operational schedule can make a 
weapons system appear to have distorted failure rates in a data set. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The major findings of our research as follows: first, that timing “Luck” of failures 
accounted for a 7% difference between the worst-case scenario downtime and actual 
downtime. Second, NSWC’s FY18Q4 report identifies an Ao between .70 and .74 for the 
system depending on system mode. This Ao is the predicted probability that the system is 
capable of performing its function when called upon. Our project calculated that the system 
was operationally available 86% of calendar days over fiscal years 2017 and 2018, showing 
that the CIWS actual performance exceeded the forecast by between 12% and 16% during 
those calendar years. Third, better allowancing for only the key offenders could potentially 
result in a 3 percent improvement to operationally available days or 751 more CIWS 
operational days per year. Finally, 10 of the 67 ships showed no downtime associated with 
CIWS which could be a result of operational schedules or maintenance periods that could 
potentially mask CIWS metrics.  
After drawing the conclusions from the data analysis, we have developed several 
recommendations. First, increase funding for the CIWS and develop an RBS model similar 
to the NAVARM to allow for better cost-benefit analysis in sustaining the CIWS. The RBS 
model is owned by Raytheon and is not available for use to study allowancing, the inputs 
for parts, and other critical data that directly affects the Ao of the CIWS.  Many 
government organizations and private companies utilize modern optimization models to 
increase logistical capability and reduce costs. These models do consider some of the 
factors previously discussed. In this era of fiscal responsibility, we as stewards of 
taxpayer’s money must ensure we are efficient and get the best value for what we spend 
public funds on. Computer optimization models are often used to aid decision-makers 
choices  
NPS OR professors Arnold Buss, Javier Salmeron, and John Wray were key 
contributors to a Readiness-Based Sparing Optimization model designed for the Naval 
Aviation community. The goal of the model was to help NAVSUP ensure the warfighter 
had the right material, at the right place, time, and price (Buss, Salmeron, & Wray, 2017). 
The simulation used mathematical models and computation tools to help make allowancing 
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determinations for sparing to availability for tens of thousands repair parts (Buss et al., 
2017). The model utilized the Ao formula discussed in CIWS Life-Cycle Sustainment 
section (2C) of this publication for the aviation community and essentially broke down the 
costs associated with increasing availability for each individual repair part in the 
simulation. This is a valuable tool for logistics personnel in trying to maximize readiness 
at the most cost and time efficient manner possible.  We recommend a similar tool be 
developed for use in the Navy Surface community.  
The second recommendation would be to adjust the next sustainment contract for 
the CIWS and try to adapt an incentivized contract, similar to ones that have been 
successful in the Naval aviation community.  Department of Defense (DoD) 
acquisition personnel have a great burden to ensure they are being good stewards of these 
large amounts of public funds. There are specific contracts the government can use to 
accomplish this.  The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 16, specifically 
section 16.401, states methods for incentivizing contracts.  Contracts need to be written to 
reward contractors for providing service above and beyond those terms. A contractor who 
is incentivized for additional profit is motivated to provide better service.    
The aviation community has several examples of incentivized PBL contracts that 
were regarded as successful, such as the E-2C tires, H-60 FLIR, and the Auxiliary Power 
Unit PBLs. “The goal of the PBL is to buy a comprehensive, performance-based contract 
that guarantees availability, improved reliability, and other desired logistics elements” (S. 
Brown, email to author, October 17, 2019). The challenge would be to ensure that clearly 
defined and executable metrics are communicated to the contractor and can be adequately 
managed by the Navy. The thermal imager is not under contract and cannot be adequately 
managed with any metrics. The first step may be to shift the thermal imager from a basic 
order agreement to a contract.  
Another recommendation is to ensure the system is being used as intended. During 
our research for this project, we discovered that part of the issues with the CIWS is the 
weapon system is not being used as intended. Specifically, two of the five key offenders 
have high failure rates because they are being used in a capacity other than described by 
technical manuals.  
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The Thermal Imager and the Exit Unit are great examples of the CIWS not being 
used in the fleet as intended by the manufacturer. The Thermal Imager is an infrared (IR) 
camera, which improves visibility at night and during inclement weather. Because it has 
the capability to be used as a navigation tool rather than a weapon system, this has led to a 
higher failure rate because ships are using it to see during low visibility periods.  The Exit 
Unit is where the ammunition is loaded and when fired exits the weapon. This is essentially 
a high usage area because sailors are constantly touching, loading, and cleaning the Exit 
Unit. This leads to higher failure rates because of human error.  Using the system as 
intended will lead to a decrease in the number of failures, specifically with the Thermal 
Imager and the Exit Unit.  
The U.S. Navy has been using the CIWS since the 1980s, and is a legacy weapon 
system. The CIWS is touted as the “Last Line of Defense,” however as technology and 
new weapons advance, replacements should be explored. The CIWS can fire 4,500 rounds 
a minute at incoming threats; however, there are potentially missiles in use designed to 
defeat the CIWS. “More and more missiles today fly at supersonic speeds of up to Mach 
2–3” (Milburn, 2016). A specific threat is China’s DF-21 Missile, “Chinese DF-21 has the 
potential to strike American carriers from heretofore unrealizable ranges and threatens to 
penetrate existing defense systems” (Farley, 2019).  
Consideration should be given to whether the CIWS can defeat these threats. It 
might be time for the CIWS to be replaced with a more capable system. Per F.A.R. Part 
12, DoD Acquisitions should consider commercially available solutions. One system could 
be the Metal Storm. “Metal Storm is an Australian-made, U.S.-funded weapons system” 
(Milzarski, 2018).   “The Metal Storm prototype was rated at 16,000 rounds per second or 
1,000,000 rounds a minute” (Valle, 2016). In light of the new threats being employed by 
China, a new close in defense system with better capability needs to be researched as a 
possible replacement for the CIWS.  
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APPENDIX A. HISTORY OF NAVY SUUPLY SYSTEMS 
COMMAND 
Janice Derk, NAVSUP PAO, provided us with a history of NAVSUP via personal 
communication on 8 August, 2019.     
 
The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) came into being 
officially on May 1, 1966, when the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts 
(BuSandA) was redesignated as NAVSUP. However, the command can 
trace its lineage directly back to February 1795, when the Office of 
Purveyor of Public Supplies was established.  
At the formation of the Continental Navy during the early days of the 
American Revolution, the Continental Congress recognized immediately 
the need to be able to supply the budding fleet and adopted a system of 
obtaining materials and supplies similar to that employed by the British. 
In 1794, construction of six new Navy ships, the first since the Revolution, 
was authorized by Congress, and responsibility for procurement of military 
supplies was given to Tench Coxe, the commissioner of revenue. Coxe, in 
turn, assigned the responsibility for procuring supplies for the shipbuilding 
project to Tench Francis, then serving as a Treasury Agent involved in 
purchasing military supplies. 
Coxe relinquished his naval procurement duties in December 1794, and 
Tench Francis assumed these duties. Then, on February 23, 1795, Congress 
established, within the Department of the Treasury, the office of “Purveyor 
of Public Supplies.” President Washington nominated, and the Senate 
confirmed, Tench Francis to the position. Tench Francis is the person to 
whom the Navy Supply Corps traces its beginnings.  
Events of the ensuing decades, including the young nation’s growing 
maritime responsibilities, saw the creation of a separate Navy Department. 
As the fleet grew, so did the responsibility to keep it supplied. In 1842, the 
Navy Department was reorganized establishing five Naval Bureaus, 
including the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing. 
The bureau was made responsible for “accomplishment of the multitude of 
tasks associated with supply and fiscal support.” Charles W. Goldsborough, 
a civilian, became the first chief of the bureau. 
Over the next 50 years, successive chiefs of the bureau introduced 
improvements and innovations, such as the theory of contracting to the 
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lowest bidder, rigid inspections of foodstuffs, and a comprehensive fleet 
supply. 
On July 19, 1892, the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing changed its name 
to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. This change recognized the 
expansion of the bureau’s interests beyond money, provisions and clothing, 
to encompass bookkeeping and supply work for the entire Navy and 
facilitated further refinement and innovation in the supply business. 
A. WORLD WAR I 
World War I served as a proving ground for BuSandA’s methods. In his 
annual report for 1918, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels said, “There 
has been no confusion, no relaxation of any of the established safeguards 
against imposition and fraud. So far as practicable, everything has been 
bought—just as it always was—after open and public competition among 
manufacturers and regular dealers.” 
Despite the wartime surge, foresight and planning before the war enabled 
the bureau to meet its commitments to purchase, store, transfer, and account 
for naval supplies. 
B. WORLD WAR II 
Where World War I was a demonstration of the effectiveness of proper 
planning, World War II became a test of the bureau’s ability to adapt to 
rapidly changing circumstances under immense pressure in a true global 
environment. 
As an illustration of the magnitude of the job, in December 1941, the Navy 
Supply Corps consisted of 2,200 officers of whom 1,400 were Reservists. 
By August 1945, there were 16,800 Supply Corps officers, 14,900 of whom 
were Reservists.  
BuSandA employed 3,569 civilians in December 1941, 2,947 of whom 
were in the field. By August 1945, the bureau had 68,622 civilians, 65,511 
of whom were in the field. 
World War II brought along rapid innovations in all fields, including 
supply, and resulted, in 1947, in the establishment of an integrated Naval 
Supply System and the reorganization of BuSandA to administer this newly 
integrated system.  
C. KOREAN WAR 
On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops attacked across the 38th parallel 
into South Korea and threatened to overrun the entire Korean peninsula. 
Two days later the United Nations authorized member states to take 
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necessary action to repel the invaders. Navy supply operations managed to 
keep the United Nations Forces replenished using existing stowage facilities 
in Japan, reliance on Military Sea Transportation Service ships for resupply 
from the United States, and workable inter-service agreements. During the 
Korean War some recently deactivated supply bases were reactivated, and 
the Navy had to procure much of the same material it had disposed of after 
World War II.  
Great leaps in technology since World War II have brought even more rapid 
change. The advent of the computer revolutionized the way all business is 
done. Computers made possible standardized supply operations at inventory 
control points, stock points, and on ships.  
In 1966 a major reorganization of the Navy Department resulted in 
replacing the bureaus with systems commands. 
Thus, when BuSandA became NAVSUP in May 1966, RADM H. J. 
Goldberg, Supply Corps, USN, became the last Chief of BuSandA, and 
Paymaster General, and the first Commander, NAVSUP, and Chief of 
Supply Corps. 
Innovations and changes continued in the ensuing years, with the 
implementation of the first phase of a uniform inventory control point 
system.  
D. VIETNAM WAR 
During the Vietnam War the impressive growth of the Navy Supply Depot 
Danang, the first major Navy Support Base in a combat zone, made it the 
largest single logistics support organization in U.S. history.    
In 1968, because of its support to operating forces deployed to Western 
Pacific and Vietnam, Naval Supply Depot Subic Bay became the first ever 
NAVSUP-managed field activity to receive a Presidential Unit Citation.      
In April 1969, NAVSUP Headquarters relocated, along with several other 
Navy activities, from its longtime home in the Main Navy Building at 18th 
and Constitution Avenue in the District of Columbia, to Crystal Mall 3 in 
Arlington, Virginia. 
E. THE 1970s 
The decade of the 1970s saw some firsts for Navy supply as well as a period 
of austerity. In addition to significant cuts in military funding in the 1970s, 
1973 saw a national energy crisis brought on by the Middle East oil 
embargo. NAVSUP was a leader in instituting both fuel economy programs 
for the Navy as well as procedures to eliminate or severely limit 
environmental contamination.  
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F. THE 1980s 
The early 1980s saw a national defense buildup, including the goal of a 600-
ship Navy. The decade also saw United States involvement in a number of 
low intensity conflicts. NAVSUP provided petroleum support to the British 
Royal Navy during their 1982 conflict with Argentina in the Falkland 
Islands. In 1982, NAVSUP also played a key role in the reactivation of the 
Iowa Class battleships and in supporting Operation Urgent Fury in Granada.  
G. THE 1990s 
The 1980s ended and the 1990s began with U.S. military forces in action. 
In December 1989, Operation Just Cause, was launched in Panama to 
capture accused drug trafficker Manuel Noriega. Just Cause carried into 
early 1990. Then, in August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, and 
Operation Desert Shield commenced, preventing further advance by Iraqi 
Forces. Desert Shield later became Desert Storm when U.S. and allied 
forces combined to oust the Iraqis from Kuwaiti territory.       
During the Persian Gulf War, the Navy, aided significantly by the planning 
and efforts of NAVSUP, largely avoided the logistics difficulties 
encountered by the other services, because the fleet “operates in war as it 
does in peace—only the tempo of operations varies.” 
NAVSUP contributed significantly during Operation Restore Hope in 
Somalia in late 1992 and early 1993, particularly through the Naval Reserve 
Supply Corps Streamlined Automated Logistics Transmission System 
(SALTS) team, in establishing the area communications system.  
In 1993, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission directed that 
NAVSUP relocate its headquarters from leased spaces in the National 
Capital Region to Navy-owned spaces in Mechanicsburg, PA. That move 
was completed on July 2, 1996, when NAVSUP raised its flag at its new 
headquarters facility at the Naval Inventory Control Point in 
Mechanicsburg. 
H. 2000 AND BEYOND 
Since the end of the cold war, the size of the Navy’s fleet has been reduced 
significantly from the close to 600-ship level of the mid-1980s. NAVSUP 
has a tradition of meeting the tests of dynamic operating and fiscal 
environments and remains dedicated to ensuring the Navy is ready to meet 
its mission. It is the resilience and adaptability of our supply community 
(civilian, active duty, and Reserve component) that allows us to overcome 
challenges, provide solutions, and deliver to our customer. NAVSUP 
sustains the fleet today, plans for tomorrow, and is always ready for sea. 
With headquarters in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, and employing a 
diverse, worldwide workforce of more than 22,500 military and civilian 
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personnel, the NAVSUP and Navy Supply Corps team share one mission—
to provide supplies, services, and quality-of-life support to the Navy and 
Joint warfighter. 
The NAVSUP/Navy Supply Corps team oversees a diverse portfolio 
including supply chain management for material support to Navy, Marine 
Corps, Joint and coalition partners, supply operations, conventional 
ordnance, contracting, resale, fuel, transportation, security assistance, and 
quality of life issues for our naval forces, including food service, postal 
services, Navy Exchanges, and movement of household goods. 
In addition to its headquarters activity, the NAVSUP Enterprise is 
comprised 11 commands located worldwide. 
NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support (NAVSUP WSS) provides program 
and supply support for the weapon systems that keep our naval forces 
mission ready, exercising centralized control of more than 375,000 different 
line items of repair parts, components, and assemblies providing global 
logistics support to our Navy’s ships, aircraft, and weapon systems. 
NAVSUP WSS also provides logistics and supply assistance to coalition 
and allied nations through the Foreign Military Sales program. 
NAVSUP Business Systems Center (NAVSUP BSC) delivers logistics 
information technology (LOG IT) solutions with specific emphasis on 
logistics and business-related products and services. This group is the 
Navy’s premier central design agency with responsibility to design, 
develop, maintain and secure information systems support Department of 
Defense and International partners in the functional areas of logistics, 
supply chain management, transportation, finance, and accounting. 
NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Centers (NAVSUP FLCs) deliver worldwide 
integrated logistics, contracting services, and products and services to 
facilitate transportation and ordnance to Navy and Joint operational units 
across all warfare enterprises and military operations. NAVSUP operates 
eight NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Centers located in Jacksonville, FL; 
Norfolk, VA; Pearl Harbor, HI; Puget Sound, WA; San Diego, CA; 
Sigonella, Italy; Yokosuka, Japan; and Manama, Bahrain.  
Navy Exchange Service Command (NEXCOM) oversees 100 Navy 
Exchange (NEX) facilities and nearly 300 stores worldwide, 39 Navy 
Lodges, the Ships Store Program, the Uniform Program Management 
Office, the Navy Clothing and Textile Research Facility and the 
Telecommunications Program Office. NEXCOM’s mission is to provide 
authorized customers quality goods and services at a savings and to support 
Navy quality of life programs for active duty military, retirees, Reservists, 
and their families. NEXs and Navy Lodges operate primarily as a non-
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appropriated fund business instrumentality. NEX revenues generated are 
used to support Navy Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs.  
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APPENDIX B. PYTHON SOURCE CODE 
Following is the Python source code that was used to compile all CIWS data sets 
from NSWC Corona Division’s top 20 Anti–Air Warfare and Anti–Surface Warfare CIWS 
offenders from FY2014 through FY2018 (DDG only); NAVSUP Weapon Systems (WSS) 
Support Common Electronics Integrated Weapons System Team’s (IWST) Major Critical 
and Critical Major Minor demand from FY2017 and FY2018; and Commander Naval 
Surface Forces Atlantic (CNSF) Supply Management Office’s CIWS demand history from 
CY2014 to CY2019.  
Python is an interpreted, object-oriented, high-level programming language 
with dynamic semantics. Its high-level built in data structures, combined 
with dynamic typing and dynamic binding, make it very attractive for Rapid 
Application Development, as well as for use as a scripting or glue language 
to connect existing components together. Python’s simple, easy to learn 
syntax emphasizes readability and therefore reduces the cost of program 
maintenance. Python supports modules and packages, which encourages 
program modularity and code reuse. The Python interpreter and the 
extensive standard library are available in source or binary form without 
charge for all major platforms and can be freely distributed. (Python, 2019) 
In order to conduct our data analyses, the three data sets referenced above needed 
to be filtered, merged, grouped, and cross referenced. Given the magnitude of the original 
data was too large for manual analysis and cleaning, Professor Daniel Reich assisted us in 
writing a Python computer program to prepare the data for analysis. This program allowed 
us to eliminate data that was not applicable to the project, focus on the most relevant date 
and conduct analyses from that data.    
 
import pandas as pd 
from pandas import ExcelWriter 
from pandas import ExcelFile 
from dateutil import parser 
from datetime import datetime 
  
def cleanRecord(record): 
    for i in range(0, len(record)): 
       if isinstance(record [i], str): 
            record [i] = record [i].strip() 
    record [‘Start’] = datetime.strptime(record [‘Start’], ‘%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S’).date() 
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    record [‘End’] = datetime.strptime(record [‘End’], ‘%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S’).date() 
    return record 
  
def readWSSrecords(filterPart): 
    dfWSS = pd.read_excel(‘Project Office Demand With Working Data 10–7-2019.xlsx’, 
sheet_name=‘FY17-18 Major Critical’, 
                           converters={‘NSN’:str, ‘Start’:str, ‘End’:str}) 
    recordListWSS = [] 
    for index, row in dfWSS.iterrows(): 
        if filterPart == None or row [‘NSN’].endswith(filterPart): 
            recordListWSS.append(cleanRecord(row)) 
    return recordListWSS 
  
def findShipSet(recordList): 
    shipSet = set() 
    for record in recordList: 
        shipSet.add(record [‘Customer’]) 
    return shipSet 
  
def findShipDowntimes(shipSet, recordList): 
    downtimeMap = dict() 
    for ship in shipSet: 
        listOfDates = [] 
        for record in recordList: 
            if record [‘Customer’] == ship: 
                listOfDates.append((record [‘Start’],record [‘End’])) 
        downtimeMap [ship] = sorted(listOfDates, key=lambda dateTuple: dateTuple [0]) 
    return downtimeMap 
  
def overlap(dateTuple1, dateTuple2): 
    if (dateTuple1[0] <= dateTuple2[0] <= dateTuple1[1]): # start2 in [start1, end1] 
        return True 
    elif (dateTuple1[0] <= dateTuple2[1] <= dateTuple1[1]): # end2 in [start1, end1] 
        return True 
    elif (dateTuple2[0] <= dateTuple1[0] <= dateTuple2[1]): # start1 in [start2, end2] 
        return True 
    elif (dateTuple2[0] <= dateTuple1[1] <= dateTuple2[1]): # end1 in [start2, end2] 
        return True 
    return False 
  
def mergeDates(dateTuple1, dateTuple2): 
    newStart = min(dateTuple1[0], dateTuple2[0]) 
    newEnd = max(dateTuple1[1], dateTuple2[1]) 
    return (newStart, newEnd) 
  
def aggregateOverlappingDowntime(shipDowntimeMap): 
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    cleanedMap = dict() 
    for ship, listOfDates in shipDowntimeMap.items(): 
        cleanedListOfDates = [] 
        for dateTuple in listOfDates: 
            if len(cleanedListOfDates) == 0: 
                cleanedListOfDates.append(dateTuple) 
            else: 
                overlapFound = False 
                for i in range(0, len(cleanedListOfDates)): 
                    if overlap(dateTuple, cleanedListOfDates [i]): 
                        cleanedListOfDates [i] = mergeDates(dateTuple, cleanedListOfDates [i]) 
                        overlapFound = True 
                        break 
                if not overlapFound: 
                    cleanedListOfDates.append(dateTuple) 
        cleanedMap [ship] = sorted(cleanedListOfDates, key=lambda dateTuple: dateTuple 
[0]) 
    return cleanedMap 
  
def shipSumamryStatSum(shipDowntimeMap): 
    aggregatedMap = dict() 
    for ship, listOfDates in shipDowntimeMap.items(): 
        numDays = 0 
        for dateTuple in listOfDates: 
            numDays += (dateTuple [1] - dateTuple [0]).days + 1 
        aggregatedMap [ship] = numDays 
    return aggregatedMap 
  
def formatDate(d): 
    return d.strftime(‘%Y-%m-%d’) 
  
def printDowntimeMapToFile(downtimeMap, filename): 
    output = ‘‘ 
    for ship in sorted(downtimeMap): 
        output += ship + ‘,\n’ 
        for dateTuple in downtimeMap [ship]: 
            output += formatDate(dateTuple [0])+’ ,’+formatDate(dateTuple [1])+’\n’ 
        output += ‘\n’ 
    with open(filename, ‘w’) as file: 
        file.write(output) 
  
def printDowntimeSummaryMapToFile(downtimeSummaryMap, filename): 
    output = ‘‘ 
    for ship in sorted(downtimeSummaryMap): 
        output += ship + ‘,’ + str(downtimeSummaryMap [ship]) + ‘\n’ 
    with open(filename, ‘w’) as file: 
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        file.write(output) 
  
def run(filterPart): 
    recordListWSS = readWSSrecords(filterPart) 
    shipSet = findShipSet(recordListWSS) 
    shipDowntimeMap = findShipDowntimes(shipSet,recordListWSS) 
    shipNoOverlappingDowntimeMap = 
aggregateOverlappingDowntime(shipDowntimeMap) 
    actualDowntimeMap = shipSumamryStatSum(shipNoOverlappingDowntimeMap) 
    worstCaseDowntimeMap = shipSumamryStatSum(shipDowntimeMap) 
    if filterPart == None: filterPart = ‘All’ 
    printDowntimeMapToFile(shipDowntimeMap, ‘Results/ship down dates WSS no 
overlap - ‘+filterPart+’.csv’) 
    printDowntimeMapToFile(shipNoOverlappingDowntimeMap, ‘Results/ship down 
dates WSS - ‘+filterPart+’.csv’) 
    printDowntimeSummaryMapToFile(actualDowntimeMap, ‘Results/ship down dates 
WSS Actual Summary - ‘+filterPart+’.csv’) 
    printDowntimeSummaryMapToFile(worstCaseDowntimeMap, ‘Results/ship down 
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APPENDIX C THESIS EVOLUTION 
This project has evolved over the course of time. Our original objectives were to 
complete a thesis with a two-fold purpose: 
• Address real problems affecting the U.S. Navy 
• Challenge ourselves to utilize skill obtained at Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) to analyze these problems.  
In keeping with these objectives, we chose a topic that included modeling and 
simulation. During studies at Naval Postgraduate School, we took a Business Modeling 
and Analysis course with Professor Daniel Reich.  
This course peaked the authors interest in modeling and a good rapport was built 
with Professor Reich, which led to the authors asking him to become the thesis advisor. 
The authors also had several classes with Professor Sullivan and were impressed with his 
research, which he presented during his classes.  
During the same timeframe a U.S. Navy Admiral came to NPS and spoke to many 
professors, instructors and students of the business school. He mentioned that the fleet was 
experiencing problems with the life cycle support of the CIWS. After hearing that speech 
and conducting some initial research the authors settled on answering the following 
research question:  
How modeling and simulation can be used to improve the operational availability 
and life cycle support of the CIWS?   
During the initial research of this project, the authors found out the CIWS is 
supported utilizing an Availability-Based Sparing (RBS) Model. According to the Defense 
Acquisition University, Availability Based Sparing is:  
Availability-Based Sparing (RBS) is the practice of using advanced 
analytics to set spares levels and locations to maximize system availability. 
Availability-Based Sparing determines the inventory requirements for 
achievement of availability goals:  
What to stock: parts, components, sub-systems (multi-indenture)  
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Where to stock: strategic distribution points (SDPs), forward distribution 
points (FDPs), and/or at operational-level distribution points (multi-
echelon)  
Taken together, these make up a two-dimensional Multi-Indenture, Multi-
Echelon—or “MIME” RBS  
Typically, the RBS model objective is to achieve availability (such as 
Operational Availability) at the least investment. (DAU, 2019)  
The authors original objective was to seek an alternative to the RBS model and try 
and improve operational availability for the CIWS using another model. After speaking to 
personnel in the PEO office, WSS, and the Naval Sea Logistics Center (NSLC) to conduct 
a full RBS model is extremely complex and time consuming. Three graduate students with 
one modeling course do not possess the knowledge, experience or have the time to 
complete this research.   
After learning a full RBS model or similar model was beyond their capability the 
authors then decided to scale down the research question. Analysis would be conducted 
and between five and ten CIWS parts would be selected, based on these parts being the 
ones that most affected Ao. After this parts identification stage in lieu of a full RBS only 
these parts would be modeled to try and improve availability. Working with personnel at 
WSS and NSWC those five parts were identified. These parts are discussed at length in the 
previous sections of this chapter.   
The next step of the research was to work with Professor Javier Salmeron, of the 
NPS Operational Research (OR) Department to model these parts. Professor Salmeron was 
a key contributor to developing Navy Aviation RBS Model, NAVARM. This RBS model 
provides the same data analytics as the RBS used to support the CIWS. 
After deliberation and discussion amongst the authors and their advisors it became 
apparent that the authors did not possess the skill set, experience, knowledge or time to 
model the top five parts affecting CIWS operational availability. At this point in the project 
it was decided the best course of action would be to conduct detailed data analysis with the 
extensive data that the authors possessed.   
In order to conduct our data analyses, the three data sets referenced above needed 
to be filtered, merged, grouped, and / or and cross referenced. Given the magnitude of the 
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original data was too large for manual analysis and cleaning, Professor Daniel Reich 
assisted the authors in writing a Python computer program to prepare the data for analysis. 
This program allowed the authors to eliminate data that was not applicable to the project, 
focus on the most relevant date and conduct analyses from that data.   The source code of 
the program can be referenced in Appendix B.   
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